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DANIEL MESSELKEN
PHYSICIANS AT WAR:
BETRAYING A PACIFIST MEDICAL ETHOS?
Introduction
This paper examines the question whether physicians are obligated 
by their professional ethos to defend a pacifist position. The question is a 
more concrete and applied formulation of the general thesis that there are 
what I will call “pacifist professions”: professions whose ethos requires their 
members to act in a pacifist way. Since the present paper is rather one in 
applied philosophy than a theoretical one about the foundation of pacifism, 
it will concentrate on the practical issue of whether and how physicians can 
execute their profession in or during war. Theoretical questions on the 
nature and extent of pacifism will be considered only to the extent necessary 
to treat the main issue.
The introductory section will give a short overview of some histori-
cal aspects of physicians’ participation in war and show the relevance of the 
issue with recent examples. The remainder of this section will thus serve to 
set the stage and to outline the connections between the medical profession 
and questions of war and peace. The paper will then be divided into three 
other main parts: the first part will be devoted to defining in a general 
manner so-called “professional pacifism”. The second part will investigate 
whether and to what extent the medical profession can be classified as a 
pacifist profession, and the third part will look at the consequences of such a 
classification.
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Historical aspects of physicians’ acting during war
Physicians have been involved in wars or in the aftereffects of wars 
since medicine came into existence (cf. Sidel (2004)). Hippocrates recom-
mended to his scholars that “he who would become a surgeon should join an 
army and follow it” (Vastyan 1978, 1695) in order to learn on the battle-
ground about surgery and medical treatment. This shows that Hippocrates 
seemingly did not see a reason why a surgeon should not work within the 
military. On the other side, “Hippocrates […] apparently rejected the 
principle that physicians have an obligation in war to succor ‘enemies’ as 
well as ‘friends’” (2004a). The idea of the physician as an impartial healer 
seems to be relatively recent and was famously promoted by the Swiss 
banker Henri Dunant after his witnessing the battle of Solferino in 1859. In 
his book Un souvenir de Solferino, he described the battle and its terrible 
aftermath, calling for the development of societies with the task of helping 
the wounded on the battlefield. He asked:
”Would it not be possible, in time of peace and quiet, to form relief 
societies for the purpose of having care given to the wounded in wartime by 
zealous, devoted and thoroughly qualified volunteers?” (Dunant 1862)
The idea of the Red Cross was born and was translated into Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law (IHL) by the Geneva Conventions in the following 
years. From that time, physicians were (morally and legally) expected not to 
actively engage in the fighting but to dispense their medical aid impartially 
to all those on the battlefield in need of it and according to medical reasons 
only. Thereupon, serving within the medical services of the armed forces 
became an alternative for those who did not want to bear arms for conscien-
tious or other reasons. Pacifists found “a ready refuge in medicine” (Gross 
2006, 287), as the medical services were deemed to be impartial and not to 
be taking part in combat operations.
Until about the eighteenth century, however, the medical knowledge 
did not allow for much help or relief for the wounded. Only later advances 
in medical technologies and better methods changed this and led, eventually, 
to the high standard of current military medicine (at least of the armed forces 
of wealthy countries). Today, as a medical officer stated, the chance of 
surviving a battlefield wound during an engagement in Afghanistan is 
higher than the chance of surviving a car accident in rural European areas.
Recent examples illustrating the relevance of the issue
Looking back into recent history, the Second World War saw nu-
merous examples of immoral research and inhumane treatment, of which 
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physicians had a part. Shortly after the war, the trials against the Nazi 
doctors revealed the degree of what had happened, and the trials eventually 
led to the establishment of the “Nuremberg Code”. The latter essentially 
addresses research ethics and is concerned with principles for human 
experimentation. In recent years, however, the mistreatment of “patients” by 
military doctors has not been a problem related to experimentation and 
research. The problems and misconduct of medical personnel rather oc-
curred, for example, when doctors participated in so-called “harsh interroga-
tion methods” (torture) on the one hand, or when medical personnel partici-
pated as part of fighting units on the other hand. Both these and other recent 
examples show that the behaviour of physicians during war and conflict still 
and rightly gives rise to public debate and moral indignation.
Physicians and war: Prevention or adequate reaction
With regard to war in general and against the background of a 
possibly pacifist obligation of the medical professions, physicians may have 
different moral duties at different times. The following three quotations 
illustrate three duties that have been ascribed to physicians, recommending 
to them different courses of action and giving weight to different aspects.
(a) Preserve peace: “The role of physicians and other health workers 
in the preservation and promotion of peace is the most significant factor for 
the attainment of health for all” (World Health Assembly 1981). Given the 
primary task of medicine (namely to achieve health), the World Health 
Assembly stated in 1981 that this goal could best be reached by preserving 
and promoting peace. Peaceful conditions are seen as necessary for a healthy 
life and as a prerequisite for a decent standard of medical care. War, on the 
other hand, by its very nature brings destruction and harm.
(b) Prevent war: “Preventing health crises, war being an example, is 
a professional moral duty for physicians” (List 2008, 244). With the destruc-
tion and harm that war and violent conflict bring about, they inevitably 
entail a public health crisis. The scale may vary from case to case, but it 
always worsens the situation compared with the pre-conflict situation. This 
is probably true also for so-called “humanitarian interventions” that, in the 
long run, aim at ameliorating the situation, but initially may worsen it by the 
use of military force and the unavoidable consequences thereof. Thus, one 
could argue above that physicians should strive to prevent war in the same 
manner as they strive to prevent other kinds of health crises.
(c) Restrict war: “[I]f war is unavoidable, then it should be waged 
with as little barbarity as possible” (Lewer 1992, 11). With this recommen-
dation, Lewer summarises the spirit of the Geneva Conventions and the 
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ideas of Henri Dunant that led Dunant to establish the Red Cross. Nothing is 
said here about an obligation to prevent war, even if the word “unavoidable” 
suggests that war should not be waged if unnecessary.
Preserving peace, preventing war, or restricting war—physicians 
seem at least to be obligated not to further war in any way. The remainder of 
this paper will explore to what extent a positive obligation to pacifist action 
may be inferred from the ethos of the medical profession.
1. Pacifist Professions
This first part of the paper investigates if and how a link can be 
established on a theoretical level between professional obligations and a 
pacifist commitment. Without concentrating on a single profession, the 
question shall be put very broadly: Are there professions whose ethe require 
their members to defend a pacifist position? This question can be further 
split into questions (i) of the moral ground, i.e., how can the connection 
between professional ethos and pacifism be established; and (ii) of the 
extent of the resulting duties, i.e., what kind of professional obligations 
imply what kind of pacifist obligations. To tackle these questions we must 
first have a short look at various forms of pacifism in order to know on what 
the argument may be based (1.1). Second, the notions of professional ethos 
and professional moral obligation have to be clarified (1.2) before they can 
be related to pacifism (1.3). The aim is to define what is meant by “profes-
sional pacifism” in general. Thus, this section lays the theoretical basis for 
the applied question of “medical pacifism” that will be considered in part 2.
1.1 Pacifism
In a very general manner, “Pacifism is a commitment to peace and 
opposition to war” and as such “is thought to be a principled rejection of war 
and killing” (Fiala 2010). However, different forms of pacifism can be 
differentiated (a) with regard to what forms of violence and war are morally 
condemned and (b) according to the extent of their resulting moral obliga-
tions. Even if these differentiations are not always clear-cut and do overlap 
at certain points, it is important and helpful to keep their various aspects in 
mind.
(a) Forms of pacifism with regard to their position against war
Different forms of pacifism can first be distinguished with regard to 
what forms of war and violence they object to. Following the classification 
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presented by Bleisch and Strub (2006) we can distinguish categorical 
pacifism from less strict anti-warism and so-called pacificism. Hence, we 
have three broad categories of pacifism with regard to the rejection of war as 
a means.
Categorical pacifism rejects all forms of violence and calls for 
strictly non-violent behaviour. Even if faced with aggression one should not 
use violent means, according to this extreme position. War is an evil that has 
always to be avoided. Often, categorical pacifism is based on religious ideas 
and it “is often tied to the idea that there is merit in suffering violence 
without retaliating” (Fiala 2010). Most prominently, this position has been 
criticised to be self-refuting by Jan Narveson (1965).
Anti-warism is less extreme insofar as it postulates only a commit-
ment against all forms of war. Using violence in self-defence can, according 
to this position, be morally justified. Going to war, on the other hand, is 
deemed to be wrong under all circumstances. This position often differenti-
ates between violence used within a state to defend the internal order and 
violence used between or among states to settle international conflicts. The 
rejection of war remains a categorical one; the rejection of violence, howev-
er, is less fundamental.
Pacificism, finally, denotes a teleological commitment to abolishing 
war. As such, it does not preclude that the recourse to war or the use of 
violent means may be necessary and justifiable on the way to achieving a 
peaceful world. War and the use of violence are deplorable, but “military 
force to defend […] political achievements against aggression” (Ceadel 
1989, 5) might sometimes be unavoidable. It can thus be described as a 
“doctrine about political—in fact international—institutions, dedicated to 
doing away with war as a means to resolve disputes between 
states” (Alexandra 2006, 111). It is not primarily about how people should 
react to a concrete situation, but its adherents “are committed to working to 
bring about a future state of affairs” (Alexandra 2006, 111).
The shared assumption of these three pacifist doctrines is that war is 
generally bad and must be avoided, and that aggressive war is wrong under 
all circumstances. Thus, anti-warism can be seen as the common denomina-
tor of all pacifist doctrines.
(b) Varieties of pacifism with regard to the extent of the commitment 
to non-violence
Several varieties of pacifist doctrine may be further distinguished 
according to their commitment to non-violence and anti-warism. Pacifism 
can be differentiated following several dichotomies that help to better 
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understand the different varieties of pacifist commitments, even if they 
overlap with some of the distinctions described above.
A first dichotomy consists in distinguishing absolute from contin-
gent pacifism. Absolute pacifists as categorical pacifists reject all forms of 
war and violence. Thus, contingent pacifism may be more interesting to look 
at. Contingent pacifism is a more pragmatic and gradual approach, and its 
rejection of war is a conditional one that depends upon other factors. Differ-
ent forms of contingent pacifism are distinguished by Fiala. His first form, 
which restricts pacifism to specific moral agents, is of particular interest 
here. Following this argument, “pacifism may not be required by all moral 
agents. Thus pacifism may only be required for members of particular 
professions” (Fiala 2010). Usually (and also in Fiala’s reasoning) this is an 
argument about religious vocations that exempts, e.g., clerics from military 
service, and it can be traced back to Thomas Aquinas. It may be a good 
starting point for our reflection on pacifist obligations of certain professions 
as there is no reason to restrict the argument to religious professions only.
A similar distinction is drawn by the second dichotomy, which 
distinguishes universal from particular pacifism. This dichotomy describes 
the “issue of whether everyone is required to be a pacifist or whether 
pacifism can be a moral choice of some particular individuals” (Fiala 2010). 
Universalists claim that if war and violence are wrong, then they are wrong 
for everyone; therefore, everybody should refrain from participating in it. 
Particularists, on the other side, hold that pacifism is rather a question of 
personal choice, and they do not condemn war or the soldiers who fight in it 
altogether. This argument can be related to the topic of this paper by not 
taking particular pacifism as a personal choice but rather as an obligation 
derived from a professional ethos. Without condemning war once and for 
all, it could nevertheless argue against the participation of some groups of 
persons in war and violence. In this sense, pacifism would be a kind of 
supererogatory obligation of particular professions, without claiming 
universal validity.
(c) Justifications of pacifism
Pacifist positions have been defended on the basis of different moral 
theories. Besides philosophical arguments, religious convictions have 
played a major role (and still do) in the defence of pacifism. Important 
historical representatives of pacifism, like Gandhi or Martin Luther King, 
Jr., were inspired by religious motives. In this paper, we will nevertheless 
concentrate on ethical arguments, which may be divided roughly into 
consequentialist and deontological ones.
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Deontological arguments in favour of pacifism usually point out the 
fact the war always involves the killing of (innocent) people and, thus, does 
not respect their moral status and basic (human) rights. As Fiala puts it, “the 
pacifist may claim that all human beings have a right to life and that killing 
in war violates this right” (Fiala 2010). Arguments like these lead to a 
condemnation of each and every war and are, thus, close to or even congru-
ent with absolutist forms of pacifism. For this reason they have confronted 
similar criticism, namely, that defending the rights of others can, under 
certain circumstances, require the use of force.
Consequentialist accounts claim that war always brings about more 
negative consequences than positive ones and, thus, leads to a negative 
overall situation. However, these accounts are most often not categorical in 
their condemnation of killing and war, but represent rather contingent forms 
of pacifism. In other words, they do not deny the (at least theoretical) 
possibility of a morally justified war. Nevertheless, some forms of contem-
porary consequentialist pacifism come close to condemning war in general; 
they argue that as a result of the development of modern weaponry, wars 
inevitably lead to catastrophic consequences. This is, for example, the 
argument of IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear 
War).
1.2 Professional Ethos and Professional Moral Obligations
As this paper wants to look at a possible connection between profes-
sional ethics and a pacifist obligation, we must deal briefly with what we 
mean by professional ethics. Even if the concept of professional ethics at 
first seems to be a rather new one, it can be traced far back in history. In fact 
“the idea that there should be special codes of ethics peculiar to particular 
professions has been current since ancient times, when the Hippocratic oath 
was required of those engaging in medical practice” (Almond 2011). 
Chadwick has given the following description of what modern professional 
ethics is about:
”Professional ethics is concerned with the values appropriate to certain 
kinds of occupational activity, such as medicine and law, which have been 
defined traditionally in terms of a body of knowledge and an ideal of 
service to the community; and in which individual professionals have a 
high degree of autonomy in their practice.” (Chadwick 1998)
Usually, the rules of professional ethics or the ethos of a profession 
are binding for the members of the profession either by law, by an associa-
tion’s regulation, or by an oath. If none is the case, a professional ethos may 
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also consist of customary habitude or tradition with a purely moral commit-
ment.
The rules and regulations of professional codes of conduct or profes-
sional ethics can serve several purposes. On the one hand, they are ethical 
guidelines for the practitioners of a profession, which tell them how to deal 
with certain situations. As such, they define what good professional practice 
looks like. First, a professional ethos consists of ethical norms, values, and 
principles that guide a profession and form a set of beliefs, practices, and 
good professional conduct. We could call this the internal aspect of profes-
sional ethics, as it addresses primarily those within the profession. On the 
other hand, a (publicised) professional ethos also allows those who consult a 
professional as client to know what they can reasonably and morally expect 
from them. Thus, professional ethics also set out role obligations that go 
along with adherence to the profession in question. This second aspect of 
professional ethics can be labelled the public aspect, as it deals with the 
mutual expectations between a profession and society as a whole. It is 
evident, that the two aspects are intertwined and cannot always be consis-
tently separated. Still, with regard to the topic of this paper, it is important to 
keep the second aspect in mind, because it deals with professional role 
obligations and possible pacifist professional obligations would fall under 
this aspect.
To summarise and to further illustrate these points, let us have a look 
at how the two aspects may be distinguished for the medical profession. As 
mentioned, professional ethics governs one’s conduct and practice during 
the professional work. Physicians, then, have two sorts of obligations. First, 
they have obligations to  the individuals whom they meet during their 
practice, such as patients or relatives. Second, physicians also have obliga-
tions to society as a whole or to the public good, such as public health. In 
both cases, both internal and public aspects of professional ethics are needed 
to address ethically difficult situations. Yet, where the public good is 
concerned, the aspect of role obligations can gain higher importance, 
whereas treating individual patients might rather concern questions of good 
professional practice.
We must underline one last and important limitation of professional 
ethics. As the term itself suggests, it is about the professional life and 
professional activities and does not (extensively) reach into the private life. 
Obligations resulting from a professional ethos do not address the person as 
an individual, but as someone who is fulfilling a professional role. As a 
result, the associated duties fade when the person stops exercising her job, 
even if a certain degree of coherency of acting professionally in private life 
might be called for. One would, for example, not accept it if a policeman or 
attorney were a regular criminal after work. Still, as long as we distinguish a 
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profession from a vocation, there can be a separation between professional 
and private life, with their respective and independent moral obligations.
1.3 “Professional Pacifism”
How can we now conceptualise a connection between the duties of 
professional ethics with a possible obligation to oppose war? We have seen 
that two important justifications of pacifism lie in the assumptions that war 
first leads to the violation of basic rights and that it leads to overall bad 
consequences for the society affected by it. Thus, if a professional ethos 
included either the protection of the basic rights in question or the increase 
of the overall good of society as an aim of professional practice, it could 
imply a commitment to pacifism. This would be the case, because war then 
ran contrary to the achievement of the aims of the professional code.
It is important to see that such a commitment to pacifism would not 
be based on a personal belief, and neither would it leave room for personal 
choice. Rather, it would then impose a duty to pacifist or at least anti-warist 
action on the members of the concerned profession as long as they were 
exercising their profession. We cannot talk, at this stage, about concrete 
implications or name the resulting obligations; yet, it would be clear that 
participation in any activity that could favour war would then not be 
allowed.
One could—and with good reason I think—ask whether the decision 
to live and defend according to pacifist standards should not be an individual 
one; that is, a choice that has nothing to do with professional obligations. 
We will keep this reservation in mind when analysing, in the next chapter, 
the question of whether the medical ethos or medical ethics oblige physi-
cians to be pacifists.
2. Medical Pacifism
Medical ethics, the professional ethics of the medical profession, has 
a very long tradition. The Hippocratic Oath and other similar documents are 
evidence of a long history reflecting what good medical practice should look 
like. This is not surprising, as medical knowledge and the skills of physi-
cians often contribute to decisions about life and death. Medical practice 
touches existential questions and, therefore, calls for sound ethical justifica-
tion. Looking at the Hippocratic Oath and later codes of conduct, we can 
assume that the main issues in medical ethics have always converged around 
the questions of who should be treated, what kind of treatment is allowed, 
and what underlying values physicians should defend. But how do these 
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questions and medical ethical principles relate to pacifism? In order to 
investigate this question, we will first look at medical ethics in general, and 
then present codes of medical ethics for wartime to finally address the 
question of medical pacifism.
2.1 Physicians’ general professional codes and general medical ethics
The Hippocratic Oath is usually seen as the origin of medical ethics, 
and it will serve us here as a point of departure for a short assessment of 
medical ethics. It will be complemented by its modern counterpart, the 
World Medical Association’s (WMA) Geneva Declaration, before we will 
summarise the so called “Principlism”—the currently most influential 
approach to medical ethics.
The spirit of the Hippocratic Oath is commonly summarised by the 
dictum Primum non nocere—first, do no harm. This simple prescription can 
still be seen as the most relevant principle in medical ethics. However, the 
oath does not name this principle explicitly, and it goes beyond this simple 
statement. Its most important passages for our context read, in a modern 
translation, as follows:
”I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick according to 
my ability and judgment; I will keep them from harm and injustice.
I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make 
a suggestion to this effect. […]
  What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment […] I will keep to 
myself.” (Post 2004, 2650)
Thus, the oath imposes on the physician to (i) act (only) for the 
benefit of the patient, (ii) to prevent harm and injustice from his patients, 
(iii) not to make wrongful use of medical knowledge, and (iv) to keep 
medical secrets in order to protect the patients’ privacy. Overall, the oath can 
be interpreted as an obligation to act in the best interests of the patient and 
only to use medicine in a way consistent with the general aim not to do 
harm. These obligations and principles have remained unchanged since the 
Hippocratic era even though medicine has undergone many developments 
since. Medical ethics have been amended to keep up with the times.
A modern form of the medical oath can be found in the codes of 
conduct of many national associations and as an international paradigm 
example in the WMA’s Geneva Declaration. The Hippocratic tradition 
clearly remains visible, but the content of the oath and its language have 
been adapted to remain understandable and to respond to modern challenges 
to medical ethics. The more relevant clauses state the following:
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”I SOLEMNLY PLEDGE to consecrate my life to the service of 
humanity; […] 
I WILL PRACTISE my profession with conscience and dignity;
THE HEALTH OF MY PATIENT will be my first consideration;
I WILL RESPECT the secrets that are confided in me, even after the 
patient has died; […]
I WILL NOT PERMIT considerations of age, disease or disability, creed, 
ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political affiliation, race, sexual orienta-
tion, social standing or any other factor to intervene between my duty and 
my patient; […]
I WILL MAINTAIN the utmost respect for human life; […]
I WILL NOT USE my medical knowledge to violate human rights and 
civil liberties, even under threat” (World Medical Association 2006)
The guidelines established in the ancient oath reappear in the Geneva 
Oath, and they are nourished with other more general principles illustrating 
the “noble tradition of the medical profession” (ibid.). Among the obliga-
tions that are more interesting in our context, we find the principle of equal 
care for all patients, the highest respect for human life, and again and very 
clearly, the obligation not to use medical knowledge inappropriately, i.e., for 
purposes other than healing and caring for patients. The fact that physicians 
shall act accordingly “even under threat” makes it clear that the oath re-
quires a high degree of commitment. Its authors were aware of situations in 
which physicians might be under pressure to further non-medical causes by 
using their medical knowledge. Acting in such a way should be prevented 
by the Declaration. Interestingly, physicians pledge even to consecrate their 
life “to the service of humanity”, which seems to imply an obligation 
beyond the strict sphere of their professional activities.
In addition to these written codes of professional conduct, general 
medical ethics are an important resource of guidance for physicians. Ever 
since it was first published in 1979, the book Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics by T. Beauchamp and J. Childress was one of the most influential 
positions in medical ethics. Today, it can be seen as the paradigm approach 
as it finds a widespread application. Even though it received a lot of critique, 
it still provides a convincing framework for debates and case discussions in 
medical ethics. Beauchamp and Childress name four principles rooted in 
common morality, which form the core of medical ethics: patient autonomy, 
non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice (Beauchamp and Childress 2009). 
All four principles have equal importance and produce prima facie obliga-
tions that, in case of conflict, have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
The principle of (patient) autonomy obligates physicians to actively 
involve their patients in any decisions about possible therapies. This requires 
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providing patients with relevant information on alternative therapies and 
their respective (dis)advantages in order to reach the patient’s informed 
consent. However, respecting the autonomy also means respecting a 
patient’s decision not to receive any treatment (see Beauchamp and Chil-
dress (2009), 104). If a patient is currently unable to give her informed 
consent, it can be replaced by the best-interests approach, which puts the 
physician in a more paternalistic role. Nevertheless, any treatment contrary 
to the (assumed) will of the patient is deemed to be immoral, as it overrules 
the patient autonomy principle.
The second principle, non-maleficence, is one of the oldest rules in 
medical ethics: primum non nocere, that means do not harm your patient. 
Even if the notion of harm is not always clear, it at least evidently forbids 
certain courses of action. The obligation not to harm is generally more 
stringent than the third principle, beneficence. The latter implies some 
positive action of helping the patient or averting harm from happening. The 
question of the objectively best course of action can sometimes compete 
with the autonomous will of the patient. Such situations can lead to the 
danger of paternalistic decisions if the values of the physician do not coin-
cide with those of the patient. Accordingly, the ethical deliberation process 
must be carried out with appropriate caution. 
The principle of justice, which is the fourth and last principle listed 
by Beauchamp and Childress, requires the equal and fair treatment of all 
patients. Mostly, it comes into play in situations where (scarce) resources 
have to be distributed. Thus, it goes beyond the strict domain of the physi-
cian-patient relationship, as it takes into account societal issues or a larger 
context.
The four principles can collide in many situations and thus do not 
prevent ambiguities in ethical judgment. In such cases, a refinement is 
needed during the ethical decision-making. Beauchamp and Childress 
propose, if necessary, to specify and balance the principles. During that 
process, the abstract and indeterminate character of the principles has to be 
reduced in order to generate more specific, action-guiding content. On the 
other hand, conflicting principles have to be balanced against each other, as 
their weight and strength can vary from case to case and according to a 
case’s characteristics. The openness of the principles and the nature of the 
deliberation process make it possible that different people may come to 
different conclusions in the same case. However, this is not per se problem-
atic, but may be interpreted as an advantage with regard to the universal 
applicability of the principlism approach.
Following the approach of Beauchamp and Childress, reasoning in 
questions of medical ethics is thus centred on the well-being of the patient 
and stresses the patient-physician relationship. Medical ethics can thus be 
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understood to follow an individual logic: it is centred on the needs and the 
will of one person, namely the patient. Only if questions of distributive 
justice come into play does the picture open up and larger groups or the 
whole society become relevant factors.
Thus, both medical codes of conduct like the Hippocratic Oath or the 
Geneva Declaration and most of medical ethics are concerned with how a 
physician should act when treating her patient. The broader context or 
circumstances do not seem to play a relevant role here, as they are only 
mentioned very rarely: be it when the Geneva Declaration upholds that even 
under external pressure medical ethics have to be followed or when the 
principle of justice calls for a fair distribution of scarce goods. 
2.2 Specific regulations and codes for physicians’ activities during 
wartime
Two other documents (or bodies of documents) explicitly deal with 
physicians’ obligations in the face of and during armed conflict. Thus, they 
are relevant for our broader question of medical pacifism: the WMA’s 
Havana Declaration and the Geneva Conventions. From a legal point of 
view their character is rather different, as the Geneva Conventions are an 
integral part of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), whereas the Havana 
Declaration has rather to be seen as a recommendation or as a corporate 
code. We will thus first present the relevant rules in IHL established by the 
Geneva Conventions and then look into the more detailed account proposed 
by the World Medical Association. 
The overall aim of the Geneva Conventions is to reduce the atroci-
ties of war to a minimum and to establish at least some rules for that 
purpose. Mainly, their purpose is to protect all those who are not or who are 
no longer taking part in hostilities and to spare them from further harm. 
Basically, “[t]he wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, to whichever Party they 
belong, shall be respected and protected in all circumstances” (Kleffner, 
2008, 329). In order to achieve this aim, several rules are established by the 
Geneva Conventions, and some of these rules directly concern physicians’ 
activities during conflict. Those delivering medical services first shall not be 
attacked and second shall not be hindered in doing their work. In their recent 
study on customary IHL, the ICRC summarises these points in the following 
rules: 
”Rule 25. Medical personnel exclusively assigned to medical duties 
must be respected and protected in all circumstances. They lose their 
protection if they commit, outside their humanitarian function, acts 
harmful to the enemy. […]
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Rule 26. Punishing a person for performing medical duties compatible 
with medical ethics or compelling a person engaged in medical activities 
to perform acts contrary to medical ethics is prohibited.” (Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck 2005, 79–86)
Thus, medical personnel are by the rules of the Geneva Conventions 
accorded a special status during war: they shall be protected in order to care 
for the wounded. It is important to recognise, however, that this status is not 
a personal privilege, but “a natural consequence of the requirements de-
signed to assure respect and protection for the victims of armed 
conflicts” (Baccino-Astrada 1982, 31). Physicians shall exercise their 
professional duties and shall not actively take part in the hostilities; their 
obligation is to uphold the principle of humanity in the midst of war. Inter 
alia, the provision of medical care has to be distributed according to medical 
needs only, according to the principle called “medical neutrality”. This also 
implies that physicians “must respect the principles of medical ethics in the 
same manner as in peacetime” (Baccino-Astrada 1982, 36). Medical ethics 
are explicitly referred to in article 16 of the Protocol Additional from 1977; 
it is, however, never specified in the Conventions what exactly is meant by 
it. For this reason, one has to assume that general medical ethics as present-
ed in section 2.1 above remain valid during armed conflict and that ordinary 
professional regulations apply.
Interestingly, the World Medical Association has, in addition to the 
general code of ethics known as the Geneva Oath presented in section (a) 
above, adopted special regulations concerning the work of physicians in 
times of armed conflict. The most important passages from this document 
called “Havana Declaration” (adopted in 1956 and revised 2006 the last 
time) read as follows:
”1. Medical ethics in times of armed conflict is identical to medical 
ethics in times of peace, as stated in the International Code of Medical 
Ethics of the WMA. If, in performing their professional duty, physicians 
have conflicting loyalties, their primary obligation is to their patients; in 
all their professional activities, physicians should adhere to international 
conventions on human rights, international humanitarian law and WMA 
declarations on medical ethics.
2. The primary task of the medical profession is to preserve health and 
save life. Hence it is deemed unethical for physicians to:
a. Give advice or perform prophylactic, diagnostic or therapeutic proce-
dures that are not justifiable for the patient's health care;
b. Weaken the physical or mental strength of a human being without 
therapeutic justification;
c. Employ scientific knowledge to imperil health or destroy life;
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d. Employ personal health information to facilitate interrogation;
e. Condone, facilitate or participate in the practice of torture or any form 
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. […]
4. The medical duty to treat people with humanity and respect applies to 
all patients. The physician must always give the necessary care impartial-
ly and without discrimination on the basis of age, disease or disability, 
creed, ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political affiliation, race, sexual 
orientation, or social standing or any other similar criterion. […]
10. Where conflict appears to be imminent and inevitable, physicians 
should, as far as they are able, ensure that authorities are planning for the 
protection of the public health infrastructure and for any necessary repair 
in the immediate post-conflict period.” (World Medical Association 2006)
The regulations mostly repeat the same topics that are treated in the 
Geneva Conventions. Physicians shall only be bound to one set of medical 
ethics; their task is about saving lives and preserving health; and they shall 
care for all human beings equally, without distinctions other than medical 
need. The last quoted provision makes mention of a new and interesting 
aspect. Physicians shall, in the face of imminent conflict, make sure that the 
medical infrastructure is working and is well-prepared for what is to be 
expected. Nothing is said here with regard to a special duty of physicians to 
prevent the conflict from breaking out. In other words, no special pacifist 
commitment is attributed to physicians; rather, they shall concentrate on 
what may be called their primary professional task: to guarantee and provide 
adequate medical care.
2.3 Medical Pacifism?
What can be said, then, about medical pacifism? Is there any profes-
sional obligation for physicians to prevent war or the outbreak of conflicts? 
As we have seen in section 1.3 above, an obligation to professional pacifism 
could result from either the professional duty to protect basic human rights 
or the professional duty to work toward the overall good of society, which 
would be thwarted by war. The question then is whether the obligations of 
medical ethics as spelled out above qualify as such duties.
As quoted in the introduction, one could argue like List that 
“[p]reventing health crises, war being an example, is a professional moral 
duty for physicians” (List 2008, 244). In his argument, he distinguishes the 
public health role of physicians from the clinical role of physicians and 
associates the former role with the obligation to prevent war. If we under-
stand the public health role in a way that implies an obligation to society as a 
whole, it could entail a pacifist obligation. War and its consequences would 
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have to be prevented by physicians in the same manner as epidemics, 
because they have equally negative consequences on the general public 
health. However, pacifism, or the prevention of war in this understanding, 
would only be a means of achieving the greater public good of health. Thus, 
the obligation is rather indirect and somewhat questionable: it is basically 
valid only on the assumption that avoiding war always has better conse-
quences than going to war. Eventually, the pacifist obligation would rely on 
a consequentialist calculus and, therefore, be reduced to a form of contingent 
pacifism.
The public health role can also be understood in a more individual 
way. As such, it implies the duty to deliver medical care to those in need in 
order to foster the general public health. Interpreted this way, the public 
health role comes closer to the clinical role, to which it would only add the 
collective aspect. Looking at the clinical role and thus taking the individual 
perspective, there is on the one hand no special medical obligation to 
prevent war. Everyone, physician or not, should act in favour of the protec-
tion of basic rights. Medical personnel during war, on the other hand, 
certainly have a special obligation with respect to the protection of basic 
human rights on two levels. First, they have to protect them when providing 
medical care. This implies, for example, the duty to treat every person 
equally and to distribute scarce resources based on medical needs only, and 
also to maintain general medical ethical principles like patient confidentiali-
ty and informed consent. Second, physicians very often, and especially 
during conflict, are in a privileged position to identify human rights abuses 
against, for example, prisoners of war. The (legal and moral) obligation to 
report those kinds of human rights abuses is part of the medical duties that 
are usually summarised under the heading of medical neutrality.
All of the arguments discussed so far do not to imply, strictly speak-
ing, what we called medical pacifism, but rather call for what I would term a 
“concerned exercise” of the professional medical duties. Basically, this 
means that physicians do not have a professional obligation to prevent war, 
but they nevertheless have the duty not to become an integral part of the war 
effort, as this would run contrary to medical ethics. A similar conclusion has 
also been defended by Geiger, albeit for different reasons. He argues against 
what we called medical pacifism, because it might damage medical ethics 
itself:
”The danger is that the attempt to shelter what I believe are political 
decisions — absolutely defensible in their own right, and available to any 
citizen — under the umbrella of conventional medical ethics may threaten 
the special protection society has afforded those ethics.” (Geiger 1991, 
115)
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Being citizens (and humans), all physicians have a right to militate 
for whatever political position they support. However, in fulfilling their 
professional role, they should refrain from using its power in order to bring 
about political aims. Certainly, one could argue that pacifism is more than a 
political aim and that medical ethics share some of its principles. Still, the 
duty to uphold medical ethics in the face of conflict and under the harsh 
circumstances of war might be seen as an ambitious task. Rather than 
supplementing medical ethics with the extra-medical obligation to pacifism, 
one should perhaps concentrate on the fundamentals and, in return, call for 
the strict compliance of physicians with their basic professional duties. The 
remainder of this paper illustrates with examples what this could mean and 
what a “concerned professional practice” should look like.
3. Practical Considerations: Physicians at War
Physicians and medical personnel face numerous difficult situations 
and ethical challenges during war. In the following, we will present three 
problematic issues and try to explain what a concerned exercise of medical 
duties should look like. Owing to the limited space available, our account 
will be rather short and the arguments may remain sketchy.
3.1 Mixed roles and blurred responsibilities
Traditionally, and as fixed in the Geneva Conventions, a strict 
separation of medical and military roles has prevailed within the armed 
forces. This reflects the special status accorded to the medical services, and, 
at the same time, guarantees impartial and optimal medical care. In recent 
years and during current deployments, this separation has been blurred, and 
it seems questionable whether there is commitment enough to uphold it. 
With rising standards of medical care and the aim of reducing the timeframe 
for medical intervention and evacuation, there are strong tactical arguments 
in favour of embedding medical personnel within fighting forces. Vastyan 
noticed such a development thirty years ago and stated:
”[A]s armies have become more and more dependent on upon medical 
technology, so too have physicians become more integral to any war 
effort. The traditional distinction between the wounding (or combat) role 
and the healing (or medical) role have become increasingly more ambigu-
ous.” (Vastyan 1974, 327)
Yet, embedding physicians into combat forces not only leads to 
losing the clear-cut role distinction, but also has other problematic conse-
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quences. One of the most discussed issues in recent years is the question of 
the armament of medical units and medical personnel and their bearing of 
the distinctive emblems. When a protective emblem (red cross, crescent, or 
diamond) is displayed, medical personnel are only allowed to carry “light 
individual weapons for their own defence or for that of the wounded and 
sick in their charge” (AP I, Art. 13,2). As long as they were not too close to 
combat operations, this restriction did not pose a problem. If medical units 
are, however, embedded into combat patrols and become a (albeit illegal) 
target, they often choose to camouflage or to remove the emblem and to 
mount heavier weaponry on their vehicles (cf. von Uslar and van Schewick 
(2010)).
Such a proceeding clearly leads to the undermining of the purely 
medical role with its associated special protection. As a result, the medical 
personnel are perceived and also perceive themselves as soldiers or even 
fighters, rather than as physicians. Renouncing the impartial distribution of 
medical care based on medical needs seems the logical next step. This, 
however, clearly runs counter both to the Geneva Conventions’ regulations 
and to medical ethics. In addition, the medical personnel obviously cannot 
distribute medical care and engage in combat simultaneously. Giving up the 
distinguished role of medical personnel thus reduces the level of medical 
care available in the field and has additional unethical consequences.
3.2 Ethically problematic tasks of medical officers
There is another, more fundamental, ethical issue of physicians’ 
participation in war. Basically, it has to be questioned whether it is ethically 
appropriate to be a physician and a soldier at the same time (for a more 
detailed discussion see Messelken and Baer (2013)). The problem behind 
the conflation of the two professions lies in the mission of medical officers, 
which is, for example, described as the “Conservation of the Fighting 
Strength” (motto of the US Army Medical Department). In contrast to the 
WMA’s Geneva Oath, where the physician pledges that the patient’s health 
will be his first consideration, one has to assert that “military medical ethics 
introduces the imperative of military necessity alongside the familiar 
principles [of medical ethics, DM]” (Gross 2010, 458). But as the wording 
“necessity” suggests, it is the military role obligations and loyalties that 
usually (and certainly in a conflict situation) prevail over medical considera-
tions. The priorities that medical officers are very often expected to follow 
are completely different from those of their civilian colleagues when it 
comes to, e.g., the order of treatment and the allocation of scarce resources. 
Adjusting medical decisions to military needs is, however, a clear infringe-
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ment of medical ethics, which do not allow the subordination of medical 
considerations to any other argument.
This is not to say that being a physician and a soldier at the same 
time is always and per se unethical. The risk of getting into ethically prob-
lematic situations is, however, built into the very definition of the tasks of 
medical officers. Németh gives a good summary of the issue:
“The military medical personnel faces the conflict originated both 
from the medical and military professions. Ethical issues arise when the 
physician is forced to choose between the benefit of an individual patient 
and the needs of an army.” (Németh 2011, 222)
To “conserve the fighting strength”, and thus to place the care for a 
collective body above considerations for individual patients, unavoidably 
entails the neglect of the duties of general medical ethics. Thus, the tasks 
and working environment of medical officers are not conducive to the 
respect of medical ethics, and a concerned exercise of the medical profes-
sion requires conviction and courage.
3.3 Medicine turned into a weapon
A third and clear example of wrongful behaviour of physicians 
during war is when medical knowledge or the distribution of medical care is 
turned into a weapon. Such a misuse of medicine can happen in several 
ways, and it is usually disguised to make it less obvious.
A very well-known form of misusing medicine often happens during 
campaigns aimed at “winning the hearts and minds” of the people. In this 
genre of campaign, medical aid is used as a means of psychological warfare. 
To be clear, it is not the fact that medical aid is distributed among the local 
population, but the motivation for doing so and sometimes also the aims of 
it. If medical care were given for humanitarian reasons and based on medi-
cal criteria, nothing could be said against it. What we find, however, is that, 
on the one hand, treatment is given and triage administered on political or 
psychological grounds (Vastyan 1974, 332ff.). On the other hand, medical 
assistance has been used to gain information or intelligence from the local 
population that could not have been attained otherwise. Prominently, the 
whereabouts and identity of Osama bin Laden were reportedly verified by 
DNA analysis from samples gained during a vaccination campaign that was 
a hidden intelligence operation.
Even worse from the point of view of medical ethics is the repeated-
ly reported assistance of physicians in so-called “harsh interrogation” and 
even torture. Torture is not only clearly forbidden by international law, but 
the use of medical knowledge or information during torture is the most 
evident breach of medical ethics. There should not be and there cannot be 
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any justification for it, and the participation of physicians in torture should 
not even be envisaged. Kottow makes the argument clear and more general 
insofar as medicine should never be abused for any other ultimate goals. He 
states:
”Allowing any military, political or power group to urge medical ethics 
into justifying ultimate goals that are contrary to medical practices proper, 
is a first step towards instrumentalising medicine for non-medical pur- 
pose. History has presented us with horrifying examples of such a pro- 
cess.” (Kottow 2006, 467)
To sum up, turning medicine into a weapon or using it with the 
intention of advancing military aims cannot be reconciled with a concerned 
exercise of the medical profession. Even if medicine is not a pacifist profes-
sion in the full sense, there are still clear limitations of its use during war.
10.12.2012. Centre for Ethics, University of Zurich
Literature
Alexandra, Andrew. 2006. “On the Distinction Between Pacifism and Pacifi-
cism.” In Pazifismus!: Ideengeschichte, Theorie Und Praxis, ed. Barbara 
Bleisch and Jean-Daniel Strub, 107–124. Bern: Haupt.
Almond, Brenda. 2011. “Applied Ethics.” In Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosohpy, ed. E. Craig. London: Routledge.
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L005SECT6
Baccino-Astrada, Alma. 1982. Manual on the Rights and Duties of Medical 
Personnel in Armed Conflict. Geneva: ICRC.
Beauchamp, Tom, and James F. Childress. 2009. Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics. 6th ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bleisch, Barbara, and Jean-Daniel Strub. 2006. Pazifismus!: Ideengeschichte, 
Theorie und Praxis. Bern: Haupt.
Ceadel, Martin. 1989. Thinking about peace and war. Oxford: Oxford Universi-
ty Press.
Chadwick, Ruth. 1998. “Professional Ethics.” In Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosohpy, ed. E. Craig. London: Routledge.
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L077
Dunant, Henri. 1862. A Memory of Solferino. http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/
files/other/icrc_002_0361_memory_of_solferino.pdf
Fiala, Andrew. 2010. “Pacifism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. Edward N. Zalta. Fall 2010.
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/pacifism/
Physicians at War: Betraying a Pacifist Medical Ethos? 399
Geiger, H. Jack. 1991. “Conscience and Obligation: Physicians and ‘Just War.’” 
Medicine and Global Survival 1 (2): 113–116.
Gross, Michael L. 2006. Bioethics and Armed Conflict!: Moral Dilemmas of 
Medicine and War. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.
———. 2010. “Teaching Military Medical Ethics: Another Look at Dual 
Loyalty and Triage.” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19: 458–
464.
Henckaerts, Jean-Marie, and Louise Doswald-Beck. 2005. Customary interna-
tional humanitarian law 1. Rules. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Kleffner, Jann K. 2008. “Protection of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked.” 
In The handbook of international humanitarian law, ed. Dieter Fleck, 325–
365. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Kottow, M H. 2006. “Should Medical Ethics Justify Violence?” Journal of 
Medical Ethics 32 (8) (August 1): 464–467.
Lewer, Nick. 1992. Physicians and the peace movement: prescriptions for hope. 
Portland, Or.: Frank Cass.
List, Justin M. 2008. “Medical Neutrality and Political Activism: Physicians’ 
Roles in Conflict Situations.” In Physicians at War, ed. Fritz Allhoff, 
41:237–253. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
Mehring, Sigrid. 2012. “Legal Aspects of Physcians’ Involvment in Armed 
Conflicts.” In Proceedings of the 2nd ICMM Workshop on Military Medi-
cal Ethics, ed. Daniel Messelken and Hans U. Baer, forthcoming. Zürich/
Bern.
Melzer, Nils. 2009. Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participa-
tion in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law. Geneva: ICRC.
Messelken, Daniel, and Hans U. Baer. 2013. “Hovering Between Roles: 
Military Medical Ethics.” In Military Medical Ethics, ed. Don Carrick and 
Michael L. Gross, forthcoming. Basingstoke: Ashgate.
Narveson, Jan. 1965. “Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis.” Ethics 75 (4): 259–
271.
Németh, L. 2011. “New Aspects of Military Medical Ethics Regarding the 
Participation of Hungarian Defence Forces in Peacekeeping Operations.” 
AARMS 10 (1): 1–10.
Post, Stephen G. 2004. Encyclopedia of bioethics Vol.5, T-X, appendices, index. 
New York [etc.]: Macmillan Reference USA.
Sidel, Victor W. 2004. “Warfare (II. Medicine and War).” In Encyclopedia of 
Bioethics, ed. Stephen G. Post, 5:2560–2565. New York: Macmillan.
von Uslar, Rolf, and Florian van Schewick. 2010. “The Red Cross as a Target?” 
Medical Corps International Forum (2).
http://www.mci-forum.com/category/challenges/145-the_red_cross_as 
_a_target.html
400 Daniel Messelken
Vastyan, E A. 1974. “Warriors in White: Some Questions About the Nature and 
Mission of Military Medicine.” Texas Reports on Biology and Medicine 32 
(1): 327–342.
Vastyan, E. A. 1978. “Warfare (I. Medicine and War).” In Encyclopedia of 
Bioethics, ed. Warren Thomas Reich, 4:1695–1699. New York: The Free 
Press (Macmillan).
World Health Assembly. 1981. Resolution 34.38. Geneva.
World Medical Association. 2006. WMA Regulations in Times of Armed 
Conflict. http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/a20/
